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Abstract 
Adaptation to climate change impacts can be proactive or reactive. Adaptation can have the 
character of a private good, a club good or a public good depending on the nature of the action. Thus 
underprovision of adaptation is likely if left to private initiative, and public policy instruments are 
required that incentivize adaptation. Such instruments should be as efficient as possible, and in other 
policy fields market-based mechanisms have been used to maximize efficiency. So far however, there 
is almost no experience with adaptation taxes, tradable project-based offsets or tradable allowances, 
whereas climate change mitigation has been a field where such instruments have been widely 
applied during the last two decades. While generally, market-based instruments for mitigation can be 
seen as successful, several key lessons have been learned. Pilot phases are important to test an 
instrument and to correct design flaws. Distortions by lobbies can lead to adverse distributional 
effects. Regulatory uncertainty reduces the efficiency gains.-Transaction costs can form a significant 
barrier.- Monitoring and independent verification are key to prevent fraud. These lessons should be 
taken into account in the design of market mechanisms for adaptation, and we derive requirements 
for that. Finally, we discuss a concrete pathway to establishing market mechanisms for adaptation 
and define priorities for further research and possible pilot implementation, differentiating by types 
of adaptation. 
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1. Background of market mechanisms in the context of adaptation and 
objectives of the paper 
Global greenhouse gas emissions are inexorably creeping upwards despite two decades of climate 
policy. Even the financial crisis of 2008 has not dented this increase. As Metz et al. (2007) have 
shown, even rapid successes in greenhouse gas mitigation would not prevent significant 
anthropogenic climate change. By 2010 the average global temperature increase since the late 19th 
century had already reached 0.7°C. Recent analyses of the pledges made by countries under the 
Copenhagen Accord (Rogelj et al. 2010, European Climate Foundation 2011) show that they are 
unlikely to keep global temperature increase below 2°C. And whether the pledges will actually be 
reached depends on the political salience of the climate change problem, which since its historic high 
in 2007 has decreased considerably. Moreover, the nuclear accident at Fukushima has put into doubt 
an emissions mitigation technology seen as important by many climate policy analysts. Given this 
gloomy background, adaptation to climate change gains in importance, especially as developing 
countries are likely to be impacted relatively strongly by even relatively small amounts of climate 
change, especially if situated in the tropics. Poor countries already now suffer from an “adaptation 
deficit” to current climate variability. For the year 2030, the UNFCCC (2007) estimates annual global 
adaptation costs at 49 to 171 billion $, with 27 to 66 billion accruing in developing countries. Parry et 
al. (2009) argue that these numbers are on the low side due to the exclusion of mining and 
manufacturing, energy, retailing, and tourism, neglect of a number of vector-borne diseases, and the 
World Bank (2010) estimates annual adaptation costs for developing countries at 70-100 billion $. 
The sectoral distribution of these costs is shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Sectoral adaptation costs in developing countries (billion $) 
Sector UNFCCC (2007) World Bank wet scenario World Bank dry scenario 
Infrastructure    2-41   27.5 13 
Coastal zones   5 28.5 27.6 
Water supply and flood 
protection   
9 14.4 19.7 
Agriculture, forestry, fisheries   7  2.6*    2.5*   
Human health   5 2 1.5 
Extreme weather events    —   6.7 6.4 
Total    28-67   81.5 71.2 
Source: World Bank (2010, p. 14)  
 
In that context, developing countries have consistently asked industrialized countries to provide 
financial resources for adaptation. In the Copenhagen Accord, industrialized countries have pledged 
30 billion $ as “fast start finance” for mitigation and adaptation in developing countries with a view 
to increase financing to 100 billion $ annually by 2020. However, the modalities of financing remain 
vague and industrialized countries have taken care to include all types of channels – bilateral, 
multilateral, concessional, private and even market mechanisms. So far, industrialized countries have 
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been unwilling to use multilateral channels and have stuck to bilateral financing modes without being 
particularly transparent.  
The few multilateral funds are even heavily dispersed to several funds: three multilateral funds have 
each around 150-250 million $ of funding: the Adaptation Fund financed by a levy on Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), the Least Developed Countries Funds (LDCF) and the Special 
Climate Change Fund (SCCF) (Climatefundsupdate, 2011). While the Adaptation Fund has the 
potential to become the largest of the three due to the steady inflow of the CDM levy (at least if 
there is an ambitious agreement on the international climate policy framework on UN-level), it may 
need some time to reach the Program for Climate Resilience (PPCR), part of the Climate Investment 
Funds, which has raised more than 900 million USD, of which 300 are deposited 
(Climatefundsupdate, 2011). 
Due to this unclear and heterogeneous financing situation, there is a real risk that funding for 
adaptation could be spent in a haphazard way that repeats a lot of the mistakes made in 
development assistance in the past decades. To avoid a future “climate finance fatigue” generated by 
industrialized country taxpayers asking whether spending has been effective and efficient, new 
mechanisms need to be discussed that could help to achieve an efficient outcome of adaptation 
funding.  
In contrast to mitigation of climate change, at first glance most forms of adaptation are not a global 
public good. Adaptation can occur along a continuum ranging from a pure private good (e.g. 
protecting a clearly delimited real estate property against flooding) over a club good (protecting 
agricultural yields through an improved irrigation system) towards a global public good (breeding of 
highly drought-resistant cultivars). Economists normally use different types of instruments to address 
such different goods (e.g. Mendelsohn (2006) proposes to use public instruments to enable 
biodiversity-related adaptation, public-private partnerships in the water sector, while leaving 
adaptation in the agricultural sector to market forces). However, if one defines adaptation more 
broadly as protection of societies as a whole against impacts of climate change, it generally can be 
seen as public good, similarly to the provision of public security.  
As shown by Economics of Climate Adaptation (2009), unit costs of adaptation projects can differ by 
orders of magnitude (see Figure 1).  
 
  
 5 
Figure 1: Differences of unit costs of hurricane damage protection projects in Florida 
Source: Economics of Climate Adaptation (2009), p. 109 
Thus efficiency of adaptation funding can be improved by choosing least-cost solutions, e.g. through 
market-based mechanisms to allocate funding. 
 
Definition of market mechanisms for the purpose of this paper 
The key feature of market mechanisms (or market-based instruments) is that a price signal is used to 
promote the production of a certain service or good, or to reduce it (see Stavins 2003). 
The quest for efficient policy instruments has led environmental policymakers to go beyond 
mandatory regulation and to look into mechanisms that provide an incentive to reduce pollution 
where it can be done at lowest cost (see Gupta et al. 2007). While market mechanisms to address 
pollution were already proposed in the early 1970s, it took until the late 1980s until they were 
applied in practice, and until the mid-1990s to see large-scale implementation. In climate change 
mitigation, market mechanisms were first proposed in the early 1990s and have started actual 
implementation in the early 2000s (see Yamin 2005, Grubb et al 2010). By 2010, global markets for 
climate change mitigation reached a turnover of 92 billion € (Point Carbon 2011), dwarfing all other 
environmental market mechanisms with regards to size. Trading systems have also been introduced 
in the case of other scarce commodities, such as access to fisheries or production rights for milk. 
Market mechanisms can take various forms. The purest one is the trading of quotas (obligations or 
permits). In case of obligations, each quota embodies the obligation to produce one unit of the public 
good. It needs definition of participants and a public regulation that requires surrendering quotas in a 
certain period. If one participant can produce the public good at low-cost, he can take over quotas 
from another participant and receives a market price. Another form is the generation of tradable 
units through projects that produce the public good. These units can be used to comply with a public 
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regulation. Instead of obligations to produce a minimal quantity of the public good, quotas can also 
be used to limit pollution: permits to produce a certain (maximum) amount of environmental 
pollution can be allocated to participants whereas the permits can be traded. In the context of 
emissions mitigation, permit trading systems exist in a number of jurisdictions whereas project-based 
systems allow generating units (“offsets”) through projects outside these jurisdictions; these units 
can then be imported into permit systems. The most famous example are the mitigation framework 
created under the Kyoto Protocol, and the European Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) – both allow 
the use of carbon reduction credits from the project – based mechanisms Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation (JI). Interestingly, the use of offsets was also a key 
feature of the US climate legislation proposed by the Obama administration in 2009.  
Some authors and many policy makers also include taxes and subsidies in the definition of market 
mechanisms. It may be noted that, if one refers to common definitions of market mechanism1, the 
validity of such a wide definition would require that these instruments apply a tax rate / grant level 
that is equal for each unit of the pollution / public good. In this paper, we regard taxes and subsidies 
also as market mechanisms, while we will mainly focus our analysis on quota systems.  
 
Past analysis of market mechanisms for the purpose of adaptation 
Regarding adaptation, with the exception of Callaway (2004), nobody has assessed the possibility to 
use market mechanisms. Callaway (2004, p. 281) proposed a system of adaptation credits “to narrow 
the difference between marginal benefits and marginal costs” but did not elaborate on it. A trading 
system for adaptation could also be specified in a way that it limits “risky activities”, and thus would 
be similar to the permit trading systems for classical pollutants (Kuch and Gigli 2007). Here, activities 
that are likely to suffer from climate change impact would be capped. Anyone wanting to engage in 
such an activity would have to acquire an allowance. The price to be paid for the allowance deters 
people from engaging in the risky activity. 
Where adaptation is linked to the reduction of resource use, market mechanisms have already been 
applied to optimize resource utilization, e.g. in the case of tradable water access rights (see Cantin et 
al. 2005, Grafton 2005 and Luo et al. 2003). However, classical literature on adaptation policy such as 
Fankhauser et al. (1999), Burton et al. (2002), Bo and Spanger-Siegfried (2004) and Agrawala and 
Fankhauser (2008) has not discussed market mechanisms et all. 
 
  
                                                           
1 Such as: “The system whereby using prices, the interaction of supply and demand allocates inputs and 
distributes outputs“ (http://www.finance-lib.com/financial-term-market-mechanism.html; accessed 16 April 
2011) or “The way in which changes in prices influence the production of goods and services and the demand 
for them” (Financial Times Lexicon, http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=price-mechanism; accessed 16 April 
2011) 
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Objectives of the paper 
In this paper, we review policy instruments that can be used in the adaptation context and analyse 
experiences made with major market mechanisms that have been implemented in the field of 
greenhouse gas mitigation. Based on this, we derive requirements for the implementation of 
potential market mechanisms for adaptation. Finally, we discuss a concrete pathway to establishing 
market mechanisms for adaptation and conclude with priorities for further research and possible 
pilot implementation, differentiating by types of adaptation. 
 
  
 8 
2. Policy instruments for adaptation  
The following paragraphs describe the main instruments that can be used for adaptation, including 
challenges as well as barriers for implementation. We also discuss some policy instrument candidates 
for adaptation that have not yet been applied on a significant scale. 
In chapter 3, we then describe lessons learned from major market mechanisms from greenhouse gas 
mitigation. This allows specifying applicability conditions and favourable design features of 
adaptation market mechanisms in chapter 4. 
 
The range of policy instruments available for adaptation 
Adaptation can be described as all activities aiming at preparing for or dealing with the impacts of 
climate change, be it at the level of individual households, communities and firms, or of entire 
economic sectors, governments and countries. Adaptation serves to reduce the damage resulting 
from the unavoidable impacts of climate change, as well as to protect lives and livelihoods (IPCC, 
2007). 
As one important reference, Agrawala and Fankhauser (2008) distinguish the following instrument 
categories relevant for key sectors: Insurance schemes (all sectors; extreme events), price signals / 
markets (water; ecosystems), financing schemes via Public-Private-Partnerships or private finance 
(flood defence, coastal zones, water), regulatory measures and incentives (infrastructure: building 
standards; zone planning), and research and development incentives (agriculture, health). 
This categorisation does differentiate on the level of policy instrument categories, but not in detail 
between policy instruments. We therefore present an own, more detailed categorisation of major 
policy instruments in Table 2. Besides, Table 2 also indicates if the policy instruments have already 
been applied and which objective the policy instrument have. Adaptation policies can have one or 
several out of four main objectives (own categorisation of the authors). These are: 
 Fund raising/mobilization for adaptation activities 
 Efficient allocation of funds that are available for projects aiming to avoid climate change 
related damages (i.e. decision which adaptation activities are to be supported with available 
funds) 
 Promotion of adaptation by various stakeholders (e.g. discouraging settlement in flood-
prone areas) 
 Sharing of financial risks in the context of climate change (e.g. transfer of risks through 
insurance based mechanisms) 
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Table 2: Policy instruments for adaptation 
Policy instrument 
category 
Major policy instruments 
for adaptation 
Already applied in the context 
of adaptation, example 
Main objective(s) of 
policy instrument 
Non-market mechanisms 
Public Private 
Partnerships 
• Service concessions 
• e over tiPublic 
• Public contracts 
• Research for e.g. drought 
tolerant seeds 
• Flood barrier operation 
with shared public-private 
responsibility 
• Promotion of 
adaptation & 
efficient 
allocation of 
funds & sharing 
of financial risks 
Regulatory 
measures 
• E.g. definition of no-
settlement zones in 
risk-prone areas 
• Planning and building acts 
• Ordinance on rainwater 
infiltration 
• Land use regulations 
• Procedures for flood 
protection 
• National planning 
frameworks 
• Promotion of 
adaptation 
Financial 
instruments 
(promotion of 
adaptation) 
• Loans 
• Guarantees 
• Not yet applied in the 
context of adaptation 
• Promotion of 
adaptation 
Financial 
instruments (risk 
financing) 
• Indemnity-based 
• Index-based 
• Weather derivative 
• Cat bond  
• Insurance-related 
instruments are in heavy 
usage today and there are 
novel forms under 
development.  
• Sharing of 
financial risks 
Market mechanisms 
Subsidies 
 
• Direct payments and 
grants (competitive 
tendering or 
payment per unit) 
• Tax reductions 
• Price supports 
• Education &information 
dissemination on potential 
risks and preventive 
measures 
• Use of new cultivars 
• Afforestation of degraded 
land 
• Building or improvement of 
dykes and other flood-
protection measures 
• Weather-proofing of 
buildings 
• Early warning systems 
• Installation of water supply, 
desalination and irrigation 
systems in areas threatened 
by droughts 
• Installation of rainwater 
infiltration facilities for 
existing public and private 
buildings 
• Removal of housing from 
• Promotion of 
adaptation  
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Policy instrument 
category 
Major policy instruments 
for adaptation 
Already applied in the context 
of adaptation, example 
Main objective(s) of 
policy instrument 
floodplains or coastal areas 
endangered by storm 
surges 
• Resettlement of farms 
Taxes and fees • Taxes to raise 
adaptation funds 
• Taxes to limit 
resource use 
 
Taxes to raise funds 
• Regional flood protection 
levy 
• Flood reconstruction levy  
Taxes to limit resource use 
• Land use taxes and fees 
• Water taxes 
• Promotion of 
adaptation 
and/or fund 
raising 
Tradable quotas • Adaptation Market 
Mechanism: 
obligation for entities 
to achieve 
adaptation units; 
tradability of quotas  
• Not yet applied in the 
context of adaptation 
• Fund 
raising/mobilizati
on & efficient 
allocation of 
funds &  
promotion of 
adaptation 
Project offsets • Domestic offsets 
• International offsets 
• Not yet applied in the 
context of adaptation  
• Efficient 
allocation of 
funds 
Related market 
mechanisms 
• Payments for 
ecosystem services 
(PES) 
 
 
 
• Water markets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Habitat banking 
PES  so far mainly relate to 
• Forests, 
• Wetlands, 
• Biodiversity, 
• Watershed protection. 
Water markets have been 
applied in  
• Agriculture, 
• industry (as a user and as an 
inventor of technological 
solutions for more efficient 
water use), 
• private households, 
• water-related ecosystems. 
Habitat banking has not yet 
been applied 
• Fund 
raising/mobilizati
on & efficient 
allocation of 
funds &  
promotion of 
adaptation 
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Following the above, the major objectives of market mechanisms in the context of adaptation can – 
depending on the design - be: 
a) Fund raising/mobilization for adaptation activities 
b) Efficient allocation of funds that are available for projects aiming to avoid climate change 
related damages, and - to a lesser extent: 
c) Promotion of adaptation by various stakeholders 
It is clear that the specific design of a mechanism will determine focus of its objective. Interestingly, 
sharing of risks cannot be considered as a major objective of an adaptation market mechanism. In 
the following, we will therefore not analyse financial instruments with a focus on risk 
sharing/transfer. Regulatory measures are also not analysed in more detail since the nature of this 
policy instrument category is too different from the one of market mechanisms. 
 
Challenges and barriers of applied adaptation policy instruments 
The instruments mentioned above face several challenges and barriers when applied. In the 
subsequent paragraphs, we describe major issues and highlight lessons to be learned for the design 
of market mechanisms for adaptation. 
 
Public-Private-Partnerships (PPPs) 
General description 
In the past decades, PPPs have been used in numerous occasions for public infrastructure projects, 
such as building of schools, hospitals, etc., and also for implementing specific capital projects such as 
the Channel Tunnel Rail Link in the United Kingdom.  
By today, PPPs are designed in manifold facets. Their major characteristic is that in PPPs, 
governments/public institutions and private sector actors conclude a legally-binding contract for the 
provision of assets and/or the delivery of services. Doing so, there is an allocation of responsibilities 
and business risks among the various partners. Typically, the government/public actor remains 
actively involved throughout the project’s life cycle. The private sector is responsible for the more 
commercial functions such as project design, construction, finance and operations. Major types of 
PPPs are public contract, service concessions and licences. Financial instruments can also be 
categorised as PPPs if a public entity is involved e.g. as the lender (Butzengeiger-Geyer, Schulze et al. 
2011, p. 52ff).  
 
Challenges and barriers 
Regarding service concessions it is worthwhile noting that they only reach an intermediary, i.e. the 
concessionaire, but not the end-consumer. So any incentive that is implemented through a service 
concession can only have indirect effects to the general public. Hence, it seems questionable 
whether a “service concession with regulative elements” can bring more value with regards to 
adaptation than an approach where the service/good is provided directly by a public entity 
(Butzengeiger-Geyer, Schulze et al. 2011, p. 52ff). 
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Financial instruments (promotion of adaptation investments) 
General description 
Financial instruments to promote adaptation can either be realized by loans or by guarantees that 
trigger or facilitate investments in adaptation by private and public actors. 
Loans represent repayable debt where the creditor additionally receives a margin consisting of the 
interest and administrative costs. Loans can in different fashions be combined with grants, either by 
charging interest rates below market level or by directly awarding payments for the investment itself 
or its implementation. More PPP-related are funds where public and private institutions contribute 
to the overall funding. This enables the bundling of resources as well as the sharing of credit risks. 
Guarantees transfer the default risk of a loan from the (private) creditor to the (public) institutions 
providing the guarantee. This instrument aims at enhancing the financing of projects without directly 
awarding a grant or some other form of payment. It facilitates credit transactions by lowering the 
costs due to default-related interest payments. Guarantees can be interpreted as PPP when either 
the lender or the provider of the guarantee is a public institution and the other part is played by a 
private institution. Guarantees do not need to focus on one project but could also back a certain 
amount of money which then finances a larger number of projects. 
The instruments mentioned above aim at the provision of the means to (or the enhancement of the) 
mobilise an investment. Thus a principal link to adaptation exists if these instruments are used in 
order to finance or to implement private actions which would have otherwise not taken place. In the 
original context innovative small and medium sized enterprises are addressed as they often face 
financial limitations, i.e. a lack of venture capital to start a promising business (Butzengeiger-Geyer, 
Schulze et al. 2011, p.56). 
 
Challenges and barriers 
Considering loans and guarantees, it is unlikely that simply raising the amount of available 
loans/guarantees will raise significant investments in adaptation as in most cases the financial 
benefit that can be realised is rather low. Combinations with other policy instruments like grants 
could set adequate incentives but solely applying loans/guarantees will not be sufficient to trigger 
broad adaptation activities. The only exception may be small companies/entrepreneurs that do not 
have access to market loans and that plan investments that will create revenues in the future (e.g. 
agricultural sector) (compare Butzengeiger-Geyer, Schulze et al. 2011, p. 57). 
 
 
Subsidies 
General description 
Subsidies can be implemented in form of direct payments (often called “grants”), tax reductions or 
price supports. The purest form of a subsidy exists if an economic entity receives an amount of 
money or an expenditure reduction which is supposed to induce the recipient to undertake a specific 
 13 
action bound to that financial incentive. In absence, the action is presumably not undertaken or not 
to the desired degree (see also Gupta et al. 2007, p. 750). 
Hence, subsidies aim to mobilize investments that are not attractive to the recipient per se. The level 
of a subsidy should be just sufficient to make the investment economically attractive as otherwise 
public money is wasted. Therefore, policymakers need to assess the economics of the activities 
before introducing subsidies and to reassess subsidy levels periodically. In order to make subsidies 
closer to market-based instruments, two options exist: either a fix subsidy is paid per unit of public 
good achieved (through which money is wasted if some projects have a lower gap) or a competitive 
tendering process assures that only projects with the lowest cost per unit of public good are 
receiving the needed subsidies.  
 
Challenges and barriers 
A general reason of the inefficiency of subsidies is that it gives polluters an incentive to pollute more 
in order to receive more subsidies, or to providers of public goods (e.g. adaptation) an incentive to 
delay the provision of the public good until the subsidy is secured (see Baumol & Oates 1988). This 
problem is similar to the question of “additionality” within the CDM. 
Furthermore grants and direct payments are usually bound to a pre-defined budget. If the whole 
amount is consumed, further action is thwarted. This requires constant steering by the budget 
administrator, both in setting the right level of granting for adequate incentivizing adaptation 
activities as well as in the overall amount of resources that are spent.  
Competitive tendering as a variation of subsidies has further challenges as the UK tendering process 
for non-fossil electricity has shown: projects other than wind and waste incineration had no chance 
for receiving funding (Reiche & Bechberger, 2004), many wind projects (winning in the tender) have 
never been implemented and some stakeholders have missed the capacity for taking part in the 
tendering process (Markard & Petersen, 2009). 
Compared to grants, tax reductions are often easier to administer. However, some major challenges 
and barriers have been identified by assessing tax reductions: they add to the complexity and opacity 
of tax systems, their budgetary consequences are sometimes difficult to estimate and they are prone 
to lobbying before implementation. All these aspects have to be carefully judged before introducing 
tax reductions (OECD 2010a). Furthermore, expedient tax reductions with adaptation benefits would 
have to be identified: will e.g. tax reductions for adaptation measures (e.g. building dams) or for 
persons most vulnerable to climate change lead to more adaptation? 
Price supports belong to the group of indirect subsidies although some direct payment is usually 
associated with them. In its most common form, the government defines a price floor for a good and 
pays the differential amount to the producers of the good as soon as the market price falls or is 
below this minimum level. This prevents the price to fall short of the minimum price. Providing price 
support as a third possibility of subsidies need to be carefully designed and assessed because they 
distort markets and individual decisions, they redistribute income and resources between economic 
sectors and between producers and consumers and they demand sufficient financial resources by the 
government being responsible for delivering the support. Besides, high administrative costs can 
occur and the instrument is prone to lobbying (compare to Porter 1990). 
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Taxes and fees 
General description 
Taxes are monetary payments by economic agents to the state which do not trigger any service in 
return. First and foremost taxes are needed to generate government revenue. These revenues are 
necessary to finance public expenditures, these might be adaptation activities. Additionally taxes can 
be used to influence private behaviour which in some markets does not lead to an optimal outcome. 
This is normally due to differences between the individual cost of consumption and the social cost. In 
this case taxes can be used to direct private behaviour towards a socially optimal behaviour. Then 
taxation has a double dividend: it improves market behaviour and leads to government revenue at 
the same time.  
There is another reason to tax some private goods. If individuals are myopic they might 
underestimate the true long run costs of the consumption. As an example take areas where forecasts 
show that they will be vulnerable to flooding in the future. If this is not taken into account 
adequately be market participants the government could levy a tax on the use of this land area. 
Therefore the land becomes less attractive and potential users might decide to use other less 
vulnerable land (see also Kline and Wichelns 1995) . 
Fees are similar in nature, but they would by definition require some type of service from the 
collecting (public) institution in return. For instance, private or public actors have to a pay for the 
right to use certain land areas or goods owned by the state. By definition of the level of fees the state 
is able to influence the behaviour.  
 
Challenges and barriers 
Taxes as an instrument for adaptation imply that the government has a better knowledge of future 
costs than the market or the participants behave myopically. This is not at all clear, since one of the 
features of a functioning market is that all available individual knowledge is gathered and feeds into 
market results. Furthermore the state is required to assess effects and readjust taxes periodically to 
achieve the pre-defined objectives of the tax (also compare Baumol 1972). 
When applying, the counterpart of the state, the private or public actor, may decide if he is willing to 
pay. However, comparable to taxes, the state has to assess effects and readjust fees periodically to 
avoid mal-adaptation or overregulation of land-use or use of goods (Butzengeiger-Geyer, Schulze et 
al. 2011, p.40). 
 
 
Quota systems, project offsets and related market mechanisms 
General description 
Neither quota systems nor project offsets have yet been applied for adaptation. Since we will 
describe their functioning at the example of mitigation policies in chapter 3 below, we do not discuss 
them here. However, there are related market mechanisms that have been applied in contexts 
 15 
related of adaptation, namely payments for ecosystem services, water markets and habitat banking. 
It may be noted that, depending on the design of the instruments, they could also be categorised as 
subsidies or quota systems. In the following, we consider them as independent instrument types. 
Payment for ecosystem services (PES) means a voluntary transaction where a well-defined 
environmental service is being bought by at least one buyer from at least one provider if that 
provider secures the provision of the service. As long as the benefits from changing the ecosystem 
are larger than conserving it, a payment is needed in order to avoid e.g. conversion of forests to 
pasture. The difference of these benefits indicates the minimum payment, while the potential 
(external) costs to others mark the upper bound of the payment. The payment then has to make the 
ecosystem manager at least indifferent between his two alternatives. One of the main features of 
PES is that the polluter-pays-principle is replaced by the beneficiary-pays-principle. Those who are 
interested in a specific environmental service compensate those actors who would have otherwise 
degraded the service by alternative usage. Working PES-schemes then need answers to the questions 
who is the seller, who is the buyer, what is the environmental service, how is the degree of 
conservation measured, how do the payments work and who initiates and administers the scheme 
(Engel et al. 2008). 
Water markets may generally address the domestic/municipal, the industrial and the agricultural 
sector. One has to add that these sectors, to a differing degree, consume tap and/or ground water.  
Around the world, fresh water resources are very unevenly distributed. An intensification of this, 
paired together with increasing average temperatures, calls for the efficient use of scarce water 
supplies. Therefore, the efficient (and appropriate) pricing of water is one of the key tasks for climate 
change adaptation. To date, water markets in many countries are either non-existent or do not price 
water efficiently, which might cause an overuse of the resource (compare Agrawala & Fankhauser 
2008). 
Habitat banking aims at conserving the ecosystem services of land, including biodiversity. Credits are 
given for the creation, restoration and enhancement of habitats, while debits occur when 
ecosystems are unavoidably degraded or destroyed, for example by development actions. Instead of 
prescribing on-site offsetting the credits allow to take compensating actions on other venues. This is 
often referred to as a no-net-loss policy, because the goal is not to fall short of an overall threshold 
of ecosystem services or biodiversity respectively. The concept adheres to the polluter-pays-
principle, because the economic agent reducing ecosystem services on one site has to pay for the 
damage incurred by financing habitat projects on other sites (see also Wunder 2005; Engel 2008)). 
 
Challenges and barriers 
While some PES-schemes have already been implemented around the globe, none of them has the 
explicit and exclusive goal of adaptation to a changing climate. Adaptation is rather a positive side 
effect of existing programmes, because their crucial aim is usually to preserve the services of specific 
ecosystems. One could argue though, that losing the adaptive benefits of certain ecosystems causes 
(external) costs, which have not yet been considered when setting up PES-schemes. Apart from this, 
especially state-financed programmes could suffer from (long-term) budgetary restrictions. 
Regarding water markets the challenge stems from the fact that ground water is very often treated 
like a public good or that it at least comes at a very low price. This may lead to opposite 
developments and conflicts of interest especially in the context of developing countries: 
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On the one hand, water access has often been appropriated by rich segments of society, while poor 
segments have to resort to private water markets, which charge prices that are an order of 
magnitude higher. Charging a uniform and “fair” market price to everyone could lower the 
expenditures of the poor while raising those of the rich. Thus the problem has more to do with 
appropriate pricing of water use (or other incentive mechanisms) than with adequate water prices as 
a market result.  
On the other hand privatization of water resources has also led to monopolistic positions of water 
supply entities with irresponsible price increases for poor population. As a consequence people have 
not been able to fund their fresh water supply anymore which created social tensions and strong 
resistance2. It is possible that privatization of basic needs like water resources might generate a 
conflict of interest between social responsibility for the poor, profit maximization of enterprises  and 
ecological or adaptive motivation of governments. Thus when considering substantial price increases 
for fresh water, access for and social conditions of poor population should be considered.  
The link between habitat banking and adaptation is obviously indirect. The instrument would be 
overburdened by using it explicitly for adaptation and not only for the original purpose, namely the 
conservation of nature (Butzengeiger-Geyer, Schulze et al. 2011, p.46-51). 
 
Lessons learned when proposing adaptation market mechanisms 
The assessment of the various policy instruments targeting adaptation shows that they have certain 
individual strengths but also face numerous individual challenges, as shown by Table 3. In case of 
financial instruments, applicability to adaptation is restricted: risk financing only addresses very 
specific areas or sectors and loans only incentivise special target groups. Comprehensive knowledge 
ex-ante is needed to avoid uncertainty of either price or adaptation effect. Furthermore restricted 
budgets might cap adaptation activities to an insufficient level. Equity is an issue in case of all policy 
instruments, e.g. by creating windfall profits. 
 
  
                                                           
2 As an example, the privatization of the water supply in the Bolivian city of Cochabamba led to significantly 
increased water prices in the year 2000. The new owner, an international consortium led by US enterprise 
Bechtel immediately raised tariffs by 35 % to 55 % which was unaffordable for large parts of the population. As 
a result the price increase created social tensions, protests, general strikes and violence with several deaths 
and a 90 days “state of emergency” for the whole country (see also Amnesty International 2000, World Bank 
2002, p. 3).  
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Table 3: Challenges of different policy instruments  
 Uncertain-
ty of effect 
 
Uncertain-
ty of price 
 
(Sectoral) 
applica-
bility 
Budget 
constraint 
 
Non-
Additio-
nality 
Windfall 
profits 
 
Lobbying 
distorting 
prices 
Subsidies        
Taxes / fees        
Public- Private 
Partnerships 
    ()  () 
Financial 
instruments  
    ()  () 
Tradable 
permits 
       
Project offsets         
: challenges; (): part challenge; : no challenge  
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3. Lessons learned from mitigation policies 
Mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions has seen the application of all types of market mechanisms 
in the past two decades. This has been a useful laboratory to test the appropriateness of market 
mechanisms and provides useful lessons for the design of market mechanisms for adaptation. In this 
chapter, we review three policy instrument types: cap-and-trade (sub-type of tradable quota 
systems), project offsets and carbon taxes.  
 
Overview of major market based instruments from mitigation policies 
 
Cap and trade mechanisms 
Cap and trade mechanisms limit the total amount of greenhouse gas emissions for an entity and 
allocate it in units, most commonly called allowances. The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 provides an 
emissions cap for industrialized countries for the period 2008-2012, which can be traded among 
countries. It took quite some time for governments to engage in transactions and by end of 2010, the 
trading volume had only reached 244 million t CO2 (PointCarbon 2011). The main reason for the 
sluggishness of transactions was the structural surplus in emissions allowances held by countries in 
transition. Potential government buyers feared that acquisition of such surplus, colloquially called 
“hot air”, would not be supported by the electorate who would see it as cheap “indulgence 
payment”.  
The EU has introduced a trading scheme for CO2 emissions of about 11,000 large industrial emitters 
from 2005 onwards, the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS). This system, which is enforced by 
high penalties, has generated the highest degree of activity of all carbon market mechanisms to date. 
Since its introduction, over 16.5 billion allowances have changed hands. However, the system has 
shown that the setting of the cap needs to be done carefully. Naturally, emitters tried by all means to 
enhance the allocation of allowances they would get, blowing up the cap. Already after the first year 
of the first phase it turned out that there was no scarcity of allowances which led to them becoming 
worthless as they could not be used after the end of 2007. While the EU Commission took this lesson 
to heart and considerably revised the allocation proposals of member states for the period 2008-
2012 downward, the eruption of the financial crisis and the resulting plunge of industrial production 
again led to the situation that there was a surplus of allowances. However, this time the price did not 
collapse as the Commission had allowed banking of allowances into the phase 2013-2020, for which a 
stringent allocation had been published ex ante.  
Through persistent lobbying emitters covered by the system had been able to get cost-free allocation 
of allowances according to historical emission volumes. In markets without international competition 
such as electricity production, the allowance price was priced in and the companies made substantial 
“windfall profits” as they did not have any costs for acquisition of allowances. To prevent further 
windfall profits, in the period starting in 2013, a substantial share of allowances will be auctioned. 
An unexpected challenge resulted from fraudsters exploiting security gaps of the trading scheme. 
Not only did a multi-billion Euro carrousel fraud develop, which defrauded the tax authorities by 
claiming a refund of (never paid) value added tax for cross-border transactions, but also millions of 
 19 
allowances were stolen from company accounts through phishing attacks. The trading scheme was 
disabled for several weeks. 
Despite these flaws, the EU emissions trading scheme has shown that a cap and trade mechanism 
can work in a large scale, provided policymakers are willing to confront power full lobbies head-on to 
set ambitious caps. 
 
Project offsets 
Even in countries where no emissions cap is set, tradable emissions credits can principally be 
generated by projects. This requires the specification of a baseline emissions level and the check 
whether the project would not have been implemented in the absence of the incentive provided by 
the sale of the emissions credits. Furthermore, project offsets need buyers, which can be motivated 
by either voluntariness or compliance with regulations. 
In the context of the Kyoto Protocol, two project-based offset mechanisms were introduced: the 
Clean Development Mechanism for emission reduction projects in developing countries and Joint 
Implementation (JI) for projects in industrialized countries. The CDM has been a resounding 
quantitative success, mobilizing almost 5,000 projects by end of 2010 with an estimated volume of 
over 2 billion emission credits before the end of 2012. JI was a bit slower but still counted almost 400 
projects and 400 million credits. 
The key challenge for project-based offsets has been the high complexity of the so-called project 
cycle that generates substantial transaction costs. An elaborate system of checks and balances was 
built up to prevent business-as-usual projects and to make sure that emission credit issuance is based 
on properly verified numbers. A vicious circle developed because the independent auditors of project 
documentation essentially failed in weeding out black sheep. Thus double and triple checks had to be 
introduced leading to long delays in project registration and the emergence of a substantial 
bureaucracy.  
 
Carbon taxes 
Carbon taxes were first introduced in the 1990s in Scandinavia. They have not spread substantially 
since, but there at least some countries in different world regions have introduced some form of 
carbon taxes – Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK 
in Europe and some states, counties and cities in North America (e.g. British Columbia, Quebec and 
Boulder city) 
In addition, numerous countries have implemented different variations of energy taxes that apply to 
various sectors. Some of these taxes cover fossil fuel resources, other target energy output and again 
others target energy consumption. A major differentiation between taxes and cap and trade systems 
is that they do not prescribe a pre-defined absolute emission target. In times of strong market 
demand for a carbon-intensive product, target uncertainty is a disadvantage from the environmental 
point of view. However, in times where there is a low market demand for the same product, taxes 
still have a regulating effect, whereas a cap and trade system may have low environmental benefits, 
as the market price falls. 
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Subsidies 
Subsidies have rarely been applied to buy greenhouse gas mitigation3 but are widely used to 
promote renewable energy and energy. The only direct subsidy for greenhouse gas reduction was 
the so-called “auction” in the context of the UK emission trading scheme in 2003. To entice 
companies and public institutions to take up an emission target, a subsidy of 215 million £ was 
offered. 32 companies bid for the subsidy in an “auction”, which generated a subsidy level of 17.79 £ 
per t CO2. (Smith and Swierzbinski 2007, p. 135).  
Renewable energy and energy efficiency subsidies have taken a massive upswing since the late 
1990s, when it became apparent that feed in tariff systems mobilized rapid expansion of renewable 
energy systems. In 2009, renewable energy subsidies totalled 45 billion $ (Morales 2010).  
 
Major challenges and barriers that faced by these instruments 
In the following paragraphs, we describe major challenges and barriers that have been encountered 
by the policy instruments above. In addition, we derive recommendations for market mechanisms in 
the context of adaptation. 
 
Cap and trade mechanisms 
The major challenges that occur when designing and introducing cap- and trade systems are the 
definition of the cap (or: the environmental target), the definition of participants (i.e. the entities 
that need to comply with the target) and the allocation of the emissions target to individual 
participants (Butzengeiger et. al., 2001). It is clear that all these items interrelate with each other and 
the optimal solution will depend on the specific situation applicable to the new instrument. However, 
at least one uniform practical challenge also exists: availability of good data. As a general rule, the 
more sophisticated the allocation method is, the more accurate and detailed data is often required. 
This needs to be considered seriously from the beginning in order to avoid later backlashes. 
 
Project offsets 
Lessons learned from the existing project-based offset mechanisms are manifold with viewpoints 
being very much politically coloured. The most important ones are: 
 Additionality: Given the fact that emission reduction credits can create significant economic 
value for a project there is the risk of cheating by project developers; i.e. they might claim 
credits for activities that would have happened anyway or overestimate the emission 
reduction levels of projects. In order to avoid this, a detailed rules system has been 
developed. This was particularly important in case of the CDM as here not only monetary 
damage can arise but also environmental one. In case of adaptation, the anticipated benefits 
                                                           
3 Subsidies are often used as non-market instruments in case of public funding directed to developing countries (e.g. Global 
Environment Facility): the funding is not allocated according to efficiency in reducing greenhouse gas emissions but rather 
for alleviating different mitigation barriers (technology, policy, information)  or even for projects with high development 
benefits. 
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are of economic, social, health and potentially environmental nature. Hence, a similar control 
will be equally important as in the case of the CDM: one will carefully need to evaluate the 
baseline and additionality of adaptation activities. 
 Monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) is an important feature of the CDM in relation 
with the previous point. One has developed detailed MRV rules per project type because the 
technical features of projects vary significantly. A key feature was to adapt an ex-post MRV 
approach to verify the ex-ante emission reduction projections. A similar approach is 
advisable for the case of adaptation projects. 
 Multiple targets: On a political level, the CDM often faced challenges because of its twofold 
function, i.e. to help industrial countries to meet their emission reduction targets, and at the 
same time to support developing countries with their sustainable development. The CDM 
often was accused not to sufficiently support the latter target. For adaptation, it would be 
helpful to either define only one political target, or to clearly prioritize among targets. 
 Institutional capacities: Given the (wanted) variety of different project types eligible under 
CDM/JI project types, there was a need to evaluate some features on a project type or 
project level. This includes the additionality criterion and determination of emission 
baselines. In the case of CDM, a highly complex system has evolved over time that includes 
several instances of checks and balances. This had not only caused high transaction costs for 
all actors involved but also led to a delay in project approvals and caused significant capacity 
needs for national approval authorities and international regulators. In order to avoid 
discouraging delays for adaptation projects, institutional capacities should be planned in a 
sensible way. 
 Pilot phase: Both JI and CDM benefited from a pilot phase for project offsets, the so-called 
Activities Implemented Jointly (AIJ) phase. Similarly, the first phase of the EU emission 
trading from 2005-2007 served for experimentation prior to the start of the Kyoto Protocol 
commitment period in 2008. In our view, such pilot phases would be very helpful for 
adaptation market mechanisms as well as they allow to gain valuable experience with both 
political issues (e.g. rule testing) and practical issues on project level (e.g. availability of data).  
 Continuity and adaptation of rules: At the same time, the regulatory framework should be 
developed in a way that allows for continuous improvement of rules – while acknowledging 
the need for planning certainty by project developers. A criticised feature of the CDM is that 
rules changes and changes in approved baseline and monitoring methodologies can (and do) 
occur on a very ad-hoc basis that affects projects that are in the validation pipeline. An easy 
solution would be to agree that no rule changes shall apply to projects once they have 
reached a certain status. 
 Capacity building: There was a huge need for capacity building and know-how transfer on all 
levels: project developers in host- and investor countries, approval authorities in host 
countries, investors, financial markets, supervisory bodies etc. It is likely that similar need will 
occur with regards to adaptation market mechanisms. 
 
A more detailed discussion and evaluation of project based offsets can be found e.g. in Michaelowa 
and Müller (2009). 
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Carbon taxes 
It goes beyond the scope of this paper to look at all types and variants of carbon taxes, but on a 
general level there are still interesting lessons to be learned. While a carbon tax levied evenly across 
major sectors can be an efficient instrument, no carbon tax has been designed in such a manner. A 
major lesson is that exception clauses – which typically occur due to intensive lobbying of interest 
groups - need to be considered very carefully in order to avoid perverse incentives and biased 
structuring of the system. For example, Bruvoll and Larsen (2004) show that such exemptions 
considerably weakened the effect of the Norwegian carbon tax. Often, strong political interest 
emerges to remove or lower taxes for certain sectors, or to define other exceptions. Overall, one 
needs to be aware that taxes are very exposed to severe political lobbying (Blanke 2002). 
 
 
Subsidies 
Subsidies generally exhibit features that promote inefficiency. In the UK CO2 subsidy case, price levels 
in the emissions trading system were much lower than the initial subsidy. This could be due to the 
fact that companies did not know their real marginal abatement cost curves or were risk averse 
(Smith and Swierzbinski 2007, p. 144f) or just that they knew the government was desperate to get 
the system going and thus willing to pay a high price.  
Renewable energy subsidies have contributed to keeping unit costs of renewable energy high as 
technology producers concentrated on maximizing production instead of reducing costs. This is due 
to capture by increasingly powerful interest groups (for an analysis of the German wind energy lobby 
see Michaelowa 2005). For example, wind turbine and solar PV unit costs increased since the late 
1990s when subsidy systems multiplied (for wind see EWEA 2009, p. 203). Only the financial crisis 
from 2008 onwards and the ensuing reduction of unit subsidy levels due to budget constraints broke 
this upward trend (see Deutsche Bank 2009, p. 48). How subsidy reductions mobilize cost reductions 
can nicely be seen in Deutsche Bank (2011, p. 12). 
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4. The way ahead for adaptation market mechanisms  
As pointed out above, market mechanisms for adaptation may have different designs and will face 
different challenges. In the following, we will line out the different design options and assess if the 
preconditions for their establishment are already met. Finally, a pathway for setting-up market 
mechanisms will be described. 
 
Design options 
When thinking about design options for international adaptation market mechanisms, we will focus 
on instruments with positive incentives (“carrots”) to provide the public good of adaptation (i.e. 
“promotion of adaptation”, see chapter 2). Options including negative incentives (”sticks”) such as 
taxation of risky activities will face higher political opposition. Tax reductions are also not assessed, 
as they can only be applied on the national but not on the international level. We thus assess:  
 fixed subsidies per unit of adaptation,  
 competitive tendering for a pre-defined subsidy volume, and  
 adaptation quotas denominated in tradable certificates.  
The first option is fix subsidies per unit of adaptation. In one variant of this option, fixed payments 
are made ex-ante to make sure that investment funding is available, given that most adaptation 
projects require high up-front investments and do not generate revenues over time. A challenge in 
this variant is the incentive for project proponents to distort the baseline (e.g. by asking for funding 
for autonomous adaptation measures) or only to announce but not to implement adaptation 
measures, given that the funding was received ex-ante. Thus, in-depth review of forecasts and a 
close monitoring process has to be included in such a scheme, as well as a pay-back clause in case of 
fraud. In the end, payments per real achievements can only be guaranteed in case of the second 
variant, fix payments ex-post. However, in this case the risk for investors is high. Therefore, high 
knowledge about climate change and adaptation measures is needed. Therefore, these ex-post 
payments may only contribute a small part of total funding, as long as risks are still high. 
The second option is competitive tendering. In this case, a certain amount of funding will be 
tendered, and project proponents would have to show how many adaptation units they can achieve 
per $ of funding. In a variant, bidders will have to show how much funding they need to achieve a 
certain amount of adaptation units. Only the projects with the best cost-to-adaptation-benefit ratio 
will be selected for funding. The challenge of this option is to accurately verify the predicted 
adaptation achievements, similar to the fix payments ex-ante option. To circumvent this problem, 
the payments may only be made in case of successful achievements. This would, however, deter 
proponents from bidding.  
The third option, tradable certificates to achieve adaptation quotas is the most challenging but may 
also become the most effective and efficient solution in the long run. Certain nations (or even 
companies) will have to be obliged to generate or procure a certain amount of adaptation certificates 
in a given time period. Then, adaptation projects will receive adaptation certificates depending on 
the achieved adaptation units. Issued certificates will be traded at a fluctuating market price 
between owners and users of such certificates. Challenges for this option – besides the political one 
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to agree on “adaptation quotas” - are again baseline and ex-post verification, as well as the 
governance of registries and trading platforms. 
 
Political requirements for adaptation market mechanisms 
A series of requirements will have to be met in order to allow adaptation market mechanisms to 
function. These preconditions can be differentiated between political and technical ones. 
Political decisions are required before any market mechanism can be technically implemented. The 
four principal political requirements are: adaptation unit definition, target definition, political 
acceptability and availability of funding. 
The initial political precondition is to define the adaptation unit. The literature on the evaluation of 
adaptation projects such as Eriksen and Kelly (2007) and Hallegatte (2009) stresses the difficulty of 
defining impact indicators for projects, while Persson (2011) even states that the lack of adaptation 
metrics is one reason why markets focusing on adaptation benefits are not feasible4. On the global 
political scale, no harmonized indicator for the adaptation unit can be found apart from “economic 
value”, the measure used by most adaptation economics studies (Economics of climate adaptation, 
2009; Moench et al., 2009), and “reducing vulnerability/increasing resilience”, the unspecific goal 
mentioned in most governance documents (GEF, 2009; AFB, 2010: 6). In a separate paper we have 
proposed to use economic and health benefits as two general indicators for defining the adaptation 
unit, while establishing no-harm standards for environmental and cultural aspects. By this, both 
“reducing vulnerability” and “economic values” can be captured.  
For a trading scheme, an adaptation target needs to be defined for each type of adaptation unit 
politically agreed (e.g. 1 million lives and 10 billion USD to be saved per year by companies of country 
x in region y). Such targets require decisions about the degree of adaptation seen as necessary. The 
establishment of quantitative adaptation targets has not even been discussed on the political level at 
all and therefore requires a strong push by researchers and analysts alike.  
The acceptability of market mechanisms cannot be taken for granted. Discussion of adaptation 
funding is heavily interrelated with equity issues. International adaptation funding is meant to 
support the most vulnerable according to all recent climate agreements (UNFCCC, 2008, 2009, 2010). 
However, market mechanisms are not expected to necessarily reach the most vulnerable. Indeed, 
market mechanisms may even intensify inequality as poorer (and, therefore, often more vulnerable) 
citizens may be less capable of converting income (e.g. adaptation funds) into opportunities (Sen, 
1993). Related to this argumentation, the hot spot problem (Stavins, 2003)5 may arise: some places 
heavily affected by climate change may receive no funding just because other places, with higher 
adaptive capacity and good institutions provide lower-cost adaptation options. Ways to reach 
political acceptability of market mechanisms would be to either define the adaptation unit in a way 
                                                           
4
 Persson (2011) sees an alternative adaptation market, based on credits for spending adaptation funds, as 
more realistic and finds patterns of early demand and supply but no true adaptation market place. While this 
“adaptation funding market” may indeed be more realistic compared to the “adaptation benefit market” we 
describe here, one may question the use of a credit that merely shows that adaptation funding has been spent.  
5
 Stavins actually refers to environmental pollution when explaining the hot spot problem: In this case, market-
based mechanisms may lead to very high pollution at specific places just because its abatement is expensive.  
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that it mainly benefits the most vulnerable or to earmark a certain share of adaptation funding for 
the most vulnerable, while the rest is allocated through market mechanisms. 
The fourth political precondition, required in case of tendering or fix payments, is the availability of 
adaptation funding. With the Adaptation Fund and other bilateral / multilateral initiatives, at least a 
sizeable level of funding is already available, so the question is rather whether political acceptability 
of its use for market-based instruments is given. 
 
Technical requirements for adaptation market mechanisms  
Apart from those political requirements, there are three primary technical preconditions for 
establishing adaptation market mechanisms: predictability, ex-post measurability of adaptation 
achievements and difference in unit costs. 
First, predictability of adaptation achievement is important in all options: it has to be possible to 
evaluate ex-ante how many adaptation units can be achieved with a specific project. If predictability 
is not given, either the policy makers do not know how to allocate funding and/or the investor lacks 
the needed information on expected later payments. Predictability is a really difficult criterion in the 
climate change adaptation context, as one needs detailed information on (local and regional) climate 
change, autonomous adaptation, change in socio-economic conditions and effectiveness of 
measures. All of this information is nowadays either not given or highly uncertain (see Adger et al., 
2007).  
Second, measurability of adaptation achievements has to be given in case of ex-post payments or 
issuance of certificates.  Measurability/verifiability means that the level of adaptation units (e.g. lives 
or USD) would need to be monitored and compared with a hypothetical baseline. Again, as in case of 
predictability, detailed information on local and regional climate change, socio-economic 
development and baseline/autonomous adaptation has to be known. While information availability 
is far from optimal, the quality of data will be better than in case of predictability: ex-post 
adjustments can be made and climate as well as economic models will improve over time. 
The issues of predictability and measurability are not trivial for adaptation policies. Measuring and 
verifying may include high transaction costs, which can be a major hurdle for market-based 
instruments (Stavins, 2003). If not enough information is available, and uncertainty will be reduced in 
the future (as is probably the case for adaptation), decisions may have to be postponed6. Given the 
uncertainty but also the high risk of climate change, it may be recommendable to focus adaptation 
not mainly on fixed investments (for which market mechanisms are best adapted) but also to 
flexibilize the capital stock, invest in research, strengthen knowledge-exchange institutions and 
establish risk-sharing instruments (Fankhauser et al., 1999). Therefore, market-based mechanisms 
with their need for certainty in predicting and measuring adaptation achievements may only be 
suited for specific adaptation measures, such as investments where certainty of returns are high (e.g. 
dams). Soft measures such as capacity building or research are better funded through a separate 
funding channel. 
                                                           
6
 Hanemann (1989) speaks about the option value in such cases. 
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A third technical precondition is the availability of different unit costs (Stavins, 2003). Market 
mechanisms are only expedient if costs to achieve adaptation units differ. This precondition is easily 
met: Economics of Climate Adaptation (2009) show that cost-benefit ratio differ considerably among 
projects. 
Once these main technical preconditions are met, the following governing functions have to be 
assigned to existing or newly established institutions: allocation of funding, verification, issuance of 
certificates, disbursement of funds, appeal procedures, enforcement of rules, establishment of 
trading platforms and anti-fraud mechanisms7.  
Table 4 shows the requirements to be met for each market based-instruments (marked with a plus) 
and non-met conditions (marked with a flash). For all options, some preconditions are not met, such 
as definition of indicators and political acceptability. The option where most preconditions are met is 
fix payments (subsidies) ex-post: assuming minimal measurability is given, the only further 
precondition is political acceptability. Other options require further preconditions to be met: Fix 
payments (subsidies) ex-ante need minimal predictability of adaptation units, while competitive 
tendering even requires strong predictability. Finally, tradable units require the definition of 
adaptation targets and thus a strong increase in political salience of adaptation. 
 
 
Table 4: Requirements for market-based instruments in adaptation policy 
 P o l i t i c a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  T e c h n i c a l  r e q u i r e m e n t s  
 Metric for 
adapta-
tion unit 
Political 
accepta-
bility 
Adaptation 
target 
Funding 
availa-
bility 
Predic-
tability 
Measu-
rability 
Different 
unit costs 
 Not given Not given Not given Given Not given Partly given Given 
Fixed subsidy 
(ex-post) 
+ + 0 + 0 +() + 
Fixed subsidy 
(ex-ante) 
+ + 0 + + (+)() + 
Competitive 
tendering 
+ + (+)()  + + (+)() + 
Quota & tra-
dable units 
+ + + 0 (+) +() + 
+ : required, (+) : partly required, 0: not required; : requirement not given,  requirement given 
 
Steps towards market mechanisms 
Figure 2 shows possible steps on the way to establishing market-based instruments. The steps, 
shown by bullet points, can only be undertaken if certain preconditions (marked with arrows) are 
met. The process starts by defining indicators (e.g. saved wealth and health) and the metric (e.g. lives 
                                                           
7
 Such governing functions are non-specific to adaptation and far from trivial: e.g. many institutions are not 
perfectly monitoring and enforcing environmental policies (Helfand et al., 2003). 
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saved, $ saved) for the adaptation unit, which almost happened in the March meeting of the 
Adaptation Fund in 2011. Given the metrics, projects would be required to report on predicted and 
achieved adaptation units. This process will help to increase knowledge and certainty on predictions 
and achievements, as well as to test the feasibility of the given adaptation indicators8. Once minimal 
measurability as well as political acceptability is given, the adaptation institutions could start with fix 
payments for adaptation achievements ex-post. As most adaptation projects need funding at the 
beginning, payments may be shifted (eventually under preconditions) to ex-ante, if minimal 
predictability is given. Predictability would need to be close to perfectness in order to move to the 
next step, competitive tendering (see also Baca 2010, p.14f). Finally, the establishment of tradable 
units can only be started, once adaptation targets are set9. All steps will first need a pilot phase, 
either for a limited set of projects or in a selected number of countries (see also Schultz 2011, p.5). 
 
Figure 2: Steps towards market mechanisms for adaptation 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
15 years ago analysts and policymakers frowned at the idea to use market mechanisms for mitigation 
of greenhouse gases. Currently, the same reaction happens if one suggests market mechanisms for 
adaptation. However, the success story of mitigation market mechanisms shows that obstacles of 
political and technical nature can be overcome. While in the case of the CDM, it took five years to 
overcome the political misgivings and another five years to set up the technical rules, eventually the 
mechanism has been able to harness entrepreneurship and mobilize thousands of projects. A key 
requirement for this was the learning through a pilot phase for projects in the second half of the 
1990s. In the case of the EU emissions trading system the political learning process was even faster, 
triggered by the failure to establish an EU-wide carbon tax. A weak spot of the market mechanisms is 
the gaming by companies, which has occurred in both the CDM and the EU trading scheme. 
Apparently, it is inevitable that lobbies influence the design of a mechanism in a way that they can 
reap rents and windfall profits. The only countervailing force is a strong, independent regulator like 
                                                           
8
 This process may be similar as the establishment and review of baseline and monitoring methodologies in 
case of the CDM. 
9 The tradable units option may be started even before competitive bidding, if adaptation targets can be 
established early, and perfect predictability is not yet given. 
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the CDM Executive Board. Monitoring, reporting and verification are key to a good functioning of 
mitigation markets; it has developed without major hiccups.  
If these lessons are translated to adaptation market mechanisms (see also Schultz 2011, p.5), it will 
require a change of the fundamental principles in spending adaptation funding. Probably only after 
several years the first scandals will erupt and angry electorates will call for efficient spending of 
adaptation funding. Then, the political willingness to decide on an adaptation unit and to agree on an 
adaptation target could develop quickly. Nevertheless, the uncertainty regarding climate impacts, 
the development of economic activity in areas threatened by climate change and the long-term 
nature of adaptation projects, as well as the difficulty to evaluate “soft” adaptation activities will be 
obstacles that mitigation market mechanisms did not encounter. As a starting point, tendering of 
adaptation subsidies and fixed adaptation subsidies could be tested in pilot phases. Subsequently, 
trading of “hard” adaptation options could be embarked upon.  
In the short term, further research is needed with regards to the definition of adaptation metrics and 
the specification of baselines for adaptation projects. Here, the evaluation of adaptation projects 
implemented in the past would be a useful testing ground.  
If the political salience of adaptation increases, in 2025 people might wonder why adaptation market 
mechanisms were seen as a strange idea in 2011. They can clearly make a difference and thus could 
help in reducing the impacts of climate change that is becoming inevitable due to the slow progress 
in mitigation. 
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